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Josh Glasgow’s book A Theory of Race (2009) presents an 
important argument for the claim that race is an illusion and, 
that racial claims are, strictly speaking, false.  They are false 
because the concept of race, according to Glasgow, makes a 
non-negotiable commitment to races being biologically based 
kinds, or at least to races not being wholly social kinds.  
Although Glasgow considers empirical evidence for this 
commitment (Ch 4), the data is inconclusive; instead he relies 
on a traditional method of thought experiment to argue that 
wholly social analyses fail to capture our intuitions (§6.2).  
Glasgow supports a reconstructionist approach which would 
have us adopt a family of concepts related to race, viz., race* 
concepts.  Race*s are very much like races, except that it is not 
part of the concept of race* that race*s are biological kinds. (I 
take it that in ordinary circumstances post-reconstruction the 
terms ‘race’ and ‘race*’ are to be pronounced the same and 
spelled the same, but as we pre-reconstructionists consider 
the reconstructionist proposal, we use the ‘*’ to keep our 
meanings differentiated (139-40).) 
 
There is much in Glasgow’s discussion that deserves close 
attention for he engages recent work in philosophy of 
language, philosophy of science, and ethics at a high level.  
His arguments deserve careful consideration and discussion.  
I would like to use these short comments, however, to 
consider the broad project and methodology of the book and 
to reflect on different ways of engaging philosophically with 
the problem of race. 
 
i. Questions and Conversations 
Questions such as “What is race?” or “What are races?” arise 
at particular moments as parts of particular conversations.  
These conversations may take place “in your head” in 
moments of private reflection; they may occur between 
several people in debate, in an argument before the Supreme 
Court, in a biology lab; or they may occur as part of a broad 
public inquiry in the US, or in another country or culture.  In 
order to adequately answer the question, it seems to me 
important to understand who is asking, why they are asking, 
what exactly they are asking about, and how the answer will 
matter.  This is not just true of race, but of other questions 
philosophers ask, e.g., What is justice?  What is knowledge?  
What is friendship?  For example, one might understandably 
ask about friendship: Is my daughter my friend?  Is my dog 
my friend?  Is my God my friend?  Could an object such as a 
book or a teddy bear be a friend? Is any friend of my friend a 
friend of mine? The question should arise: why do you want 
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to know?  What is at stake right here, right now, in calling 
someone or something a friend? 
 
Consider another question, “Who is in your family?” or 
“What is a family?” I think many of us would not be sure 
how to answer this question.  Is an unmarried adult couple 
with no children a family?  Does it matter if the couple is gay 
or lesbian?  History matters.  Context also matters: When I am 
in the doctor’s office and the doctor asks me if I know my 
(adopted) son’s family, I don’t say, “Well, duh!”  I know she 
means to be asking about his birthfamily.  When my daughter 
and her birthsister are together and someone asks of the 
sister, “Is she in your family too?” the question is clearly 
about whether we adopted them both.  In adoption and GLBT 
literature (and bumper stickers) it is common to see the line: 
“Love makes a family.” The law doesn’t always see it that 
way, and the law matters.  But neither blood, nor love, nor the 
law, fully determine the boundaries of family. 
 
What should we make of this?  Should we say that the term 
‘family’ is ambiguous?  ‘Familyb’ means biological family; 
‘familys’ means social family; ‘familyl’ means legal family?  
Should we say that the term ‘family’ expresses a cluster 
concept so that a is part of b’s family just in case a and b are 
sufficiently related by love, law, or kinship structures, etc?  
Should we say that ‘family’ is polysemic with several 
intertwined threads of meaning, possibly developing over 
time?  Should we say that ‘family’ is an essentially contested 
concept as it is so embedded in the different social meanings 
of kinship?  Should we say that ‘family’ is univocal and 
functions (roughly) as a contrast word that situates others as 
more or less close along some dimension indicated by 
context?  There are many options of this kind to consider.  But 
a further plausible option is that there is no fact of the matter 
about which of these options captures “what ‘family’ means” 
because meaning is not captured by descriptive conditions of 
this sort at all (I’ll return to this last suggestion). 
 
It is hard to know what is the best approach to understanding 
family.  But it would not seem helpful to insist that a 
particular set of intuitions that arise in philosophical inquiry 
are going to settle the issue in a way that matters to people 
who are actually wondering about the boundaries of family.  
There are two different reasons why.  First, if there is a 
question about who is in my family, or what makes it the case 
that someone is in my family, this is not plausibly going to 
arise from my confusion about what the term ‘family’ means 
or what the concept of family entails.  I already know how to 
use the term meaningfully, and have an adequate grasp of the 
concept, but, at least in the case at hand, that knowledge 
doesn’t settle the issue.  The problem is that, if I am sincerely 
asking the question, what ‘family’ means gives out just when 
I need it.  Either it doesn’t entail anything for the case I’m 
wondering about, or what I judge it to entail seems wrong.1  
Both are likely possibilities in circumstances of social change.2  
It is not plausible to claim that the meaning of ‘family’ is so 
determinate that it anticipates and settles all eventualities, or 
that its meaning is so written in stone that it cannot 
accommodate new (or newly discovered) circumstances.  
 
Second, use of the term ‘family’ is part of a set of practices 
that have normative import.  This import need not be entailed 
by the concept, but may be pragmatically implicated by an 
utterance involving the word.  To put it in slightly different 
terms, to designate someone as a member (or not) of my 
family is to perform a speech act that brings with it normative 
consequences defined by the social context.  These 
consequences cannot be explored simply by considering the 
literal meaning of the term ‘family’ and the aptness of the 
speech act is not simply a matter of deciding whether the 
term ‘family’ descriptively applies.  Suppose someone tells 
me that their intuitions about what makes a family entail that 
I am not a mother, that I’m only a mother*.3 A natural 
response would be to consider the nature of this speech act: is 
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it a purely descriptive act? What standing would be needed to 
perform the act?  Why am I being told this?  What is being 
implicated?  It is true that I am not the biological mother of 
my children, but what am I supposed to conclude from this?  
How does that fact matter in the circumstances?  In all 
respects that make a difference to my social and moral 
obligations to my children, I am their mother, so the 
observation would seem to have a much more suspect point, 
e.g., to stigmatize me or my family in some way.  And it 
would be reasonable for me to reject it.  It would seem, then, 
that not only is the intuition that ‘mother’ means ‘biological 
mother’ not important to how I live or ought to live, but the 
statement of this intuition is reasonably rejected by a 
competent user of the term. 
 
How, you might ask, does this apply to Glasgow’s argument?  
How are my reflections on family relevant for thinking about 
race?  The two concepts are similar in some ways: both seem 
to have a biological and a social component, and both carry 
significant social and moral implications.  Moreover, I think it 
likely that statements such as “mothers are biologically 
related to their children” would garner at least as much 
support from the “folk” as claims about the biological basis 
for race; and political philosophers frequently rely on 
intuitions about the family that ignore the existence of 
adoptive and other non-traditional families.  But it would be 
seriously problematic, I believe, to rely on these facts to 
conclude that the concept of family is non-negotiably 
committed to having a biological basis and that non-
biological families are only families*.   
 
I’m not arguing, however, that we should understand races as 
families. (Cf. Stubblefield 2005.)  My concern is more 
methodological.   Three issues carry over from family to race:  
(i)  What is the context in which we are asking about race? (ii) 
What reason do we have for thinking that there is a “core 
meaning” 4 of race committed to there being a biological basis 
for racial groups, especially under conditions of social and 
scientific change? And (iii) how, if at all, do intuitions about 
meaning matter?  I have offered the example of family in part 
because it shows that if we embed questions about language 
and concepts in social context, especially complex and 
evolving social contexts, we must be attentive to the limits of 
semantic-seeming intuitions, whether philosophical or “folk,” 
as a basis for our inquiry. 
 
ii. Questioning Race 
Questions about race occur, as mentioned above, in many 
different contexts.  The term ‘race’ has a history in biology, 
anthropology, sociology and law, and a history in ordinary 
public speech.  When philosophers begin to think about race 
they have a number of options.  We can help out the 
biologists and legal theorists by clarifying or explicating their 
notions.  We can engage with a history of philosophers’ use of 
the term ‘race’.  I’m sure there are a variety of other 
worthwhile projects along these lines.  But one that is 
especially important for critical race theorists is to begin with 
the everyday challenges of racial injustice.   
 
I watch my children being disadvantaged by interpretations 
of their skin color and other markings of race; I see the ways 
that this disadvantage accumulates and spreads.  I experience 
the impact of this on my neighborhood.  I witness the ways in 
which these interpretations are supported by the media and 
are embedded in social and political structures.  When I begin 
to theorize, these are the phenomena—the divisions of 
privilege and disadvantage along racial lines—I want to 
understand.  My questions arise in a context where the reality 
of race weighs on me and the challenge is to achieve some 
analytical and critical distance.   
 
This is also my experience in the classroom.  Racial 
differences are assumed, experienced, and enacted.  They 
affect where students sit, how they engage with each other 
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and the material, how they understand themselves.  My goal 
is to raise questions that enable them to critically engage their 
understanding of themselves as raced: what does it mean to 
be Black or Latina, American Indian or South Asian?  What 
does it mean personally, historically, socially?  We are all 
competent users of the term ‘race,’ but that doesn’t tell us 
what race is or what it means to belong to a race.  I’m 
convinced that just as philosophers’ intuitions about the 
concept of family won’t settle my questions about who is in 
my family, philosophers’ intuitions about racial possibilia 
won’t answer our questions about what it is to be raced. 
 
If our starting point as we inquire into what race is, is the 
social experience of race and the social implications of race, it 
is not a serious option to claim that race isn’t real.  It is like 
someone saying to me that I am not a mother but only a 
mother* because according to their intuitions, mothers are 
those who give birth (or at least carry a child to a certain stage 
of pregnancy?).  Given where I begin my inquiries into race 
and family, and the questions I am asking, these sorts of 
abstract intuitions do not engage the issues.  Nor does 
empirical investigation into the “ordinary person’s” abstract 
intuitions about race.  I don’t trust the “ordinary” person’s 
ideas about race because I believe that the very social 
processes that create the divisions of privilege and advantage 
also obscure their workings.  Investigation of unreflective 
ideas about race is potentially interesting because it can reveal 
how obscurantist ideology works (and anti-realists from 
Appiah to Glasgow offer important insights into this 
ideology), but it is rarely a source of insight into the reality of 
racial hierarchy as it is lived. 
 
So, considering Glasgow’s discussion, I’m worried about the 
questions he wants his account to answer.  I don’t really 
understand—or to be more candid, maybe the problem is that 
I find alienating—the context that supposedly gives rise to his 
questions and motivates his line of thought.  His questions 
seem to be a mix of political, psychological, biological, and 
philosophical, but without a clear object.   
 
This may seem an unfair complaint because in his admirably 
clear way, Glasgow graphically highlights the questions and 
principles that guide his project.  For example, he states that 
his agenda is motivated by what he calls the “normative 
question”: 
 
The Normative Question: Should we eliminate or conserve 
racial discourse and thought, as well as practices that rely 
on racial categories (2)?  
 
So let’s take this to be a question posed in conversation.  If 
Glasgow were to ask me this question, I would have a fairly 
simple answer: Of course we should work to eliminate social 
practices that constitute or perpetuate racial injustice and we 
should engage in racial thought and discourse to the extent 
required to do this.  Should we continue to use racial terms 
and concepts after racial injustice has been eliminated?  We’ll 
have to see how our social practices evolve and whether it 
makes sense to extend our current vocabularies to the new 
social groups that emerge. 
 
 Why is this answer inadequate? 
 
iii.  The “Semantic Strategy” 
Glasgow would reject this answer, it seems, because he 
adopts the semantic strategy Ron Mallon (2004) criticizes: 
 
Thus the broad orientation of the race debate is that 
the normative is held to depend on the ontological, 
which in turn is held to depend on the conceptual.  
Mallon calls this dialectical move, of defending a 
normative position partly on the basis of ontological 
and at bottom semantic (and I would add, folk-
theoretical) theses, “the semantic strategy” (12). 




The worry, it seems, is that if race is not real, then we cannot 
reasonably conserve racial thought and talk because that 
would be tantamount to endorsing false thought and talk.  
This worry becomes a serious problem because, on Glasgow’s 
view, racial thought and talk is “non-negotiably committed” 
to a biological basis for race that we now know does not 
obtain. 
 
I myself find the idea of non-negotiable commitment 
unhelpful, and would not grant that for (almost) any concept 
there is some proposition that is strongly non-negotiable (25).  
But the more important issue, I believe, is identifying the 
object of inquiry.  Glasgow seems to hold that what matters 
for shared concepts, shared meaning, and ultimately joint 
inquiry is a set of fixed and non-negotiable assumptions.  If, 
however, what we are talking about and inquiring into is 
something in the world, an entity, a structure, a kind or 
property, we may share meaning and overlap in our 
inquiries, even if we have profoundly different 
understandings of what we are investigating and how.  It is 
perfectly possible, for example, for those who think water is a 
fundamental element and essentially liquid to be talking and 
thinking about the same stuff as those who think it is a 
compound of hydrogen and oxygen and possibly solid or 
vaporous.  (And even more radical divergence in 
assumptions is possible.) 
 
As I indicated in the previous section, the critical race theorist 
is confronted with racial divisions, and these divisions are the 
subject matter of our (CRT) inquiry.  These divisions are 
described in racial terms, they are justified using racial 
ideology, they are experienced as dictating racial identities.  
To suggest that they aren’t really racial divisions because there 
is no biological basis for the groupings sounds as bizarre as 
saying that my family is not a real family because we aren’t 
related by blood.  The object of our inquiry is not something 
we access by determining what satisfies “non-negotiable” 
conditions some associate with the term ‘race’.  The object of 
our inquiry is the racial divisions in the world and what 
causes them.5  
 
This may not be a criticism of Glasgow, if we allow that there 
are multiple legitimate projects concerning race, with 
multiple objects.  One might suggest, for example, that 
Glasgow’s argument supports the idea that there are at least 
two worthwhile inquiries about “race” (understood 
neutrally), one about race (the purported biological kind) the 
other about race* (the purported social kind).  As he suggests 
in considering the compatibility of the normative and 
conceptual projects, there need be no conflict (19).  Critical 
race theory (CRT) could be construed as having race* as the 
object of its inquiry, and philosophical race theory (PRT), 
including the bulk of Glasgow’s book, as inquiring into race.  
However, this is not a plausible interpretation of Glasgow’s 
comments about race*, for he does not think that races* 
currently exist and it is our job to bring them into existence, 
through (at least partly) a conceptual revolution, 
 
…reconstructionism is a normative program for 
designing a coherent conceptual architecture that will 
bring about the reality of races* and racial* identities 
(145).  
 
It is puzzling to me, then, what Glasgow takes our current 
racial divisions to be.  They aren’t races and they aren’t races*.  
Surely they exist and have social significance; for CRT, they 
are the proper subject of our inquiry.  But they don’t even 
appear on Glasgow’s landscape.  So however interesting and 
smart his discussion is, a critical race theorist may be forgiven 
for thinking it is mostly beside the point.   
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iv.  Racial Meanings 
Recall that Glasgow adopts the semantic strategy that 
requires us to answer the normative question about racial 
thought and talk by determining first whether race is real; this 
in turn requires us to elucidate the concept of race, drawing 
on either empirical research or philosophical intuition.  If we 
don’t adopt this strategy, how do we proceed?  I have 
asserted that there are racial divisions amongst us, and these 
divisions are what critical race theory aims to investigate.  
(This is, of course, compatible with different projects 
investigating different phenomena, e.g., the use of ‘race’ in 
biology, law, or philosophy.)  Glasgow maintains, however, 
that the semantic strategy is apt for determining whether 
races, in the “ordinary sense” exist.  Is this true and is it in 
conflict with CRT?  Do those engaged in CRT, as I’ve 
described it, forfeit a claim to be capturing the ordinary sense 
of ‘race’ or the ordinary concept of race?  There are two 
possibilities.  On one hand, some working on CRT may be 
content to claim that they are not invested in capturing the 
ordinary concept of ‘race’ because this meaning is sufficiently 
corrupt that it only matters as part of an ideological 
debunking.  Glasgow’s arguments may be useful as part of 
this debunking project (though demonstrating how the 
ordinary concept of race functions to sustain unjust racial 
divisions would be an important part of this project not 
included in Glasgow’s discussion).  On the other hand, a 
proponent of CRT might reject a priori reflection – whether 
on the part of philosophers or the “folk” – as the right method 
for determining the content of our concepts or ordinary 
meaning of our terms.  It would then be incumbent on this 
approach to lay out a different strategy for unpacking our 
ordinary concept. 
 
This task is tantamount to formulating a substitute for the 
traditional project of conceptual analysis, thus it is not 
something I can accomplish here.  Glasgow’s discussions of 
semantic externalism, especially in §§2.2, 3.2-3, 6.2-3, are very 
judicious and helpful, and he clearly recognizes the value of 
different approaches to meaning.  Let me sketch the 
externalist approach to meaning I favor and suggest briefly 
how it is relevant to the debate between Glasgow and CRT as 
I’ve described it. (See also Haslanger forthcoming.) 
 
Thoroughgoing externalists hold the Millian or Russellian 
view that terms have a single meaning, viz., their referents, 
and a term does not get its referent by virtue of yet a further 
semantic item such as a Fregean sense.  According to 
externalists of this sort, the meaning of a term is determined 
by a variety of complex pragmatic and causal factors.  
Typically we will have descriptions in mind that pick out the 
same referent as the term in question, or so we believe, but 
these descriptions are not part of the term’s meaning, nor do 
they provide a “folk theory” that determines or even 
constrains, in the context of utterance, what we refer to.  Such 
externalists about meaning also believe that this account has 
implications for the theory of concepts and hold that (at least 
most of) our concepts have wide content (Lau and Deutsch 
2008); just as what makes something a footprint is that it is 
caused (in the right way) by a foot, so what makes something 
a belief about water is that it is caused (in the right way) by 
water. 
 
Roughly, it is incumbent on any account of meaning to 
explain how our thought and language are related to 
particular parts of the world.  On externalist views, the 
weight of this explanation is placed on the world and its 
impact on us; having latched onto the world we find multiple 
ways to describe it.  Sometimes our descriptions are accurate 
and sometimes not.  On the traditional descriptivist model, in 
contrast, the explanation gives priority to the nature of 
thought.  We have a thought and it turns out that there are 
things in the world that satisfy or match it.  We communicate, 
according to the externalist, by talking about the same things; 
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according to the descriptivist, by expressing the same 
thoughts. 
 
On this account, we share meanings, not by having the same 
“folk theory” of the subject matter, but by both being part of a 
“historically extended representational tradition,” within 
which we are each trying to make sense of that tradition as 
we engage with the world it purports to represent. (Schroeter 
and Schroeter 2009; Bigelow and Schroeter 2009) Being part of 
such a tradition is consistent with substantial disagreement 
on any particular claim; what matters is that we are engaged 
collaboratively with others in a shared project of representing 
what or how things are in some corner of the world.  So, for 
example, we can still mean the same thing by ‘water’ and 
communicate about water even if we disagree about what 
composes water, whether the ocean is filled with water, and 
whether water is good to drink, as long as we are each 
working to apply the term ‘water’ in light of our best 
interpretation of a shared linguistic tradition. 
 
As I see it, the “historically extended representational 
tradition” concerning race is an attempt to make sense of and 
explain striking phenotypical differences between humans, 
differences that are typically associated with differences in 
geographical origins.  Because geography has divided 
cultures and cultures affect individual psychology, there have 
been ongoing questions about the relationship between 
appearance, geography, culture, and individual character.  
Human difference has resulted in human division because 
these differences – interpreted in quite different ways – have 
been taken to be socially meaningful.  When we speak of race 
we are participating in a tradition of attempts to make sense 
of the apparent physical-geographical-cultural differences 
that divide us.  At times these divisions have been thought 
grounded in God’s will, at other times in genetics, or in social 
practices.  Differences in these explanatory strategies do not 
prevent us, however, from talking about the same thing; and 
false beliefs about what we are talking about, e.g., that the 
divisions are grounded in biology, do not prevent us from 
referring to the divisions as they actually exist.   
 
In closing, I’d like to bring us back to the consideration I 
raised in discussing families that words can do more than 
describe the world, they can be used to include and exclude, 
and to problematize existing groupings.  As we consider our 
“historically extended representational tradition,” we will 
sometimes need to make judgment calls about how to extend 
the tradition to new cases.  Just as our talk of families will 
need to make judgment calls about what counts as a family 
beyond, and in opposition to, what the representational 
tradition has encountered before, so likewise we will need to 
do the same as we reorganize ourselves around, and in spite 
of, appearance and culture.  In doing so, our speech is not 
simply descriptive, but performative.  When I tell the airline 
attendant that I am my daughter’s birthsister’s aunt, I am 
constituting family relations.  When I corn row my daughter’s 
hair with extensions, I am refusing to be White.  The 
representational tradition is a dynamic process that includes 
what we do now.  This gives us opportunities for 
destabilizing entrenched beliefs and divisions and choices 
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1 The second option itself can be explained in several ways.  
Having the concept of family and being a competent user of 
the term may be compatible with ignorance or confusion 
about hard cases; or it may be that the meaning of family is 
not static but evolves in response to new circumstances and 
contexts of use.  I will explore the latter option later in these 
comments.  See also (Haslanger forthcoming). 
 
2 Technological and scientific change are also relevant: is the 
gestational mother of a child–one who is neither the genetic 
nor life mother of the child—part of his or her family?  In 
considering terms that are less socially loaded than ‘family’ 
scientific change may be an even more important issue than 
social change. 
                                                                                                  
 
3 Adoptive parents are familiar with the experience of being 
told that they are not their child’s real mother.  And I know of 
a family in which the adoptive parents refuse to call the 
biological mother of their children the “birthmother” because 
on their view “any woman who would give up her children 
does not deserve to be called a ‘mother’.”  Both examples 
illustrate the point. 
 
4 Glasgow claims that his view is not committed to 
descriptivism in the philosophy of language, i.e., the view 
that the referent of a term is determined by a set of 
descriptions or “folk theory” associated with the term (25).  
His view seems to be that for (almost) any concept C there is a 
set of non-negotiable beliefs that someone who has the 
concept C must hold and these beliefs constrain what the 
concept applies to.  However, on his view, concepts are 
importantly connected to meaning: we gain access to the 
meaning of a term such as ‘race’ by exploring our concept of 
race and the associated non-negotiable “folk theoretical” 
beliefs.  So it would seem that he holds at least a weak form of 
descriptivism.  Although it may not be that the descriptive 
content of a concept that serves as the meaning of a term is 
sufficient to determine the referent, the term expresses the 
concept and the non-negotiable elements of the concept 
constrain what can count as the referent.  In what follows, I’ll 
speak of the “core meaning” to refer to what Glasgow thinks 
is that non-negotiable part of the concept that constrains the 
referent of the term. 
 
5 Racial divisions, it should be noted, predated genetics and 
modern biology (Stocking 1994).  Biological theories were 
offered to explain racial divisions (and replaced metaphysical 
and religious theories).  Those theories have turned out to be 
false, but that doesn’t mean that the racial divisions aren’t real 
and in need of explanation. 
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6 Thanks to Robert Gooding-Williams and Stephen Yablo for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
